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Notes on a fire
Paul J. du Plessis
University of Edinburgh, Scotland
My first meeting with Professor Tsuno occurred under somewhat less 
than edifying circumstances. On an excursion to a restaurant in the Black 
Forest at one of the SIHDA conferences, a waitress had accidentally spilt 
an entire tray of drinks over me as I sat at a table waiting for lunch to be 
served. Drenched in alcohol, I was struggling to maintain my normally 
good-natured persona. Professor Tsuno, who was sitting near me and who 
had narrowly avoided that same tray of drinks, dryly observed that perhaps 
the actio de effusis vel deiectis might be apposite in this case. This good-
humoured attempt at Romanist wit did much to improve my mood on the 
day. It is therefore my pleasure to repay that compliment by contributing 
this small piece to his Festschrift. The focus of this piece is a single text 
by Ulpian:
D.19.2.11.1 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) Si hoc in locatione convenit ‘ignem 
ne habeto’ et habuit, tenebitur etiam si fortuitus casus admisit 
incendium, quia non debuit ignem habere. Aliud est enim ignem 
innocentem habere: permittit enim habere, sed innoxium, ignem.
If it was a term of the lease that the tenant should have no fire, but he 
had one, he will be liable even if a conflagration arose accidentally, 
for he had no right to have a fire at all. It would be a different thing 
if the term were that he should keep his fire innocuous; this allows 
him to have a fire, though only one that does no harm. [Monro 
translation]1
In this seemingly uncontroversial text, Ulpian sets out two rules in rela-
tion to the keeping of a fire in a rented property. Rule 1: Where it had been 
agreed in the lease ignem ne habeto and the tenant had a fire which causes 
loss to the landlord, the tenant will be liable under the contract (ex locato) 
even if the fire had occurred fortuito casu, since he had no right to have a 
fire. Rule 2: Where it had been agreed in the lease ignem innocentem ha-
beto/ignem negligentiam ne habeto (we cannot be certain about the word-
ing of the contractual provision), and the tenant had a fire which causes loss 
to the landlord, the tenant will be liable under the contract (ex locato), “if 
it does harm”, that is, where dolus or culpa can be attributed to the tenant 
1 Monro, C. Digest XIX.2. Locati Conducti – translated with notes (Cambridge 1891).
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or those for whom he is legally responsible.2 From a dogmatic perspective, 
therefore, the effect of the contractual provision articulated in Rule 1 (ig-
nem ne habeto) was to extend the scope of the tenant’s contractual liability 
beyond the default “standards”.3 It is not my intention in this contribution 
to focus on the dogmatic implications of this text as they are well docu-
mented. Instead, I wish to show that by examining the broader context of 
this statement, it is possible to gain new insights into the text.
Establishing the motivations for the creation of such a contractual pro-
vision is a difficult (some might say impossible) task as many variables, 
such as the nature of the property and the interests of the landlord, have to 
be taken into account.4 This becomes especially difficult in the case of texts 
from the Digest which have been stripped of their context. Traditionally, 
scholars of Roman law have examined the Palingenetic context of these 
texts in an attempt to establish some context. In the case of D.19.2.11.1, the 
text is surrounded by two other statements by Ulpian. They are:
D.19.2.11 pr (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) Videamus an et servorum culpam 
et quoscumque induxerit praestare conductor debeat? Et quatenus 
praestat, utrum ut servos noxae dedat an vero suo nomine teneatur? 
Et adversus eos quos induxerit utrum praestabit tantum actiones 
an quasi ob propriam culpam tenebitur? Mihi ita placet, ut culpam 
etiam eorum quos induxit praestet suo nomine, etsi nihil convenit, 
si tamen culpam in inducendis admittit quod tales habuerit vel suos 
vel hospites: et ita Pomponius libro sexagesimo tertio ad edictum 
probat.
Let us consider this point: Is a lessee bound to answer for negligence 
on the part of his slaves or of such other persons as he allows to be 
on the premises? And if so, how far does his responsibility extend? 
Is it enough in the case of slaves to surrender for noxa, or will he be 
liable personally? And in the case of other persons, is it enough to 
assign to the lessor his own rights of action against them, or must 
he answer for their negligence just as if it were his own? My own 
opinion is this; he must answer personally for the negligence even 
of those whom he introduced, although there should have been no 
agreement to that effect, that is, provided it was his own negligence 
that he introduced them, in short there was negligence in having 
2 This is articulated in a text which covers similar ground, but where the context 
is clearly rural land which had been rented out for an agricultural purpose, see 
D.19.2.9.3 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.). 
3 For an expansive discussion of the development of the notions of risk and liability in 
the contract of letting and hiring, see Du Plessis, P. “‘Liability’, ‘Risk’ and Locatio 
Conductio” in Modelli teorici e metodologici nella storia del diritto privato IV 
(Naples 2011), 63 – 95.
4 Frier, B. Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome (Princeton, NJ. 1980), 63.
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such persons in the house, whether they were members of the family 
or guests. This view is confirmed by Pomponius (ad Edict. Lib. 
LXIII.). [Monro translation]
…
D.19.2.11.2 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) Item prospicere debet conductor ne 
aliquo vel ius rei vel corpus deterius faciat vel fieri patiatur.
Moreover the person who hires is bound to see that he does not 
impair or suffer to be impaired any right attached to the thing let, or 
do or allow any injury to the thing itself. [Monro translation]
At first sight, these two texts which surround D.19.2.11.1 do not seem 
to provide much contextual information. Neither reveal what type of thing 
was let or what may have motivated the landlord in D.19.2.11.1 to draft a 
provision ignem ne habeto. It is my contention, however, that D.19.2.11 pr, 
a text traditionally used to explain the evolution of the tenant’s vicarious 
liability for slaves and dependants, in fact reveals much more about the 
context of D.19.2.11.1 than previously realised. To demonstrate this, I wish 
to focus on three aspects of the contractual provision expressed in Rule 1.
The first relates to the wording of the contractual provision recorded 
here. References in the Digest to contractual provisions forming part of 
the contract of letting and hiring occur in two forms.5 Let us take two ex-
amples:
D.19.2.29 (Alfen. 7 Dig.) In lege locationis scriptum erat: 
‘redemptor silvam ne caedito neve cingito neve deurito neve quem 
cingere caedere urere sinito.’ …
A written lease contained the following provisions: “The lessee 
shall not fell, bark or burn trees, nor suffer any one to fell, bark or 
burn.” … [Monro translation]. 
D.19.2.30.3 (Alfen. 3 Dig. a Paulo Epit.) Qui aedem faciendam 
locaverat, in lege dixerat: ‘quoad in opus lapidis opus erit, pro 
lapide et manupretio dominus redemptori in pedes singulos septem 
dabit.’ …
A person who engaged another to build a house inserted the 
following term in the contract: “So far as any stone shall be required 
for the work, the employer is to give the contractor 7 sesterces a foot 
for the stone and the labour”: … [Monro translation]
5 Du Plessis, P. “The Roman Concept of Lex Contractus”, 2006 (3 – 1) Roman legal 
tradition, 79 – 94.
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The careful reader will have noticed two points of difference in these 
texts. In the first, it is explicitly stated that the lex locationis was written (…
scriptum erat …), whereas the second merely mentions that the lex stated 
(… dixerat …). Whether this should necessarily be taken to mean that the 
lex in the second text was unwritten is virtually impossible to establish, 
especially since it is not always clear from the texts whether the lex in any 
given example was recorded in writing or not. It was certainly not a legal 
requirement that the lex had to be written down, although our sources sug-
gest that recording was common in more complex transactions and that the 
written lex had some evidentiary value in a court of law.6 The second nota-
ble point about these two texts is the difference in the Latin used. While it 
can of course not be ruled out that Paul’s epitome of Alfenus’ work in the 
second text may account for the change in the Latin, it is notable that the 
Latin used in the contract in the first text is very different to that used in 
the second. The Latin used in the first text is very formal and reminiscent 
of legislative provisions in old statutes such as the Twelve Tables, whereas 
the Latin used in the second text seems more colloquial by comparison. If 
we compare the Latin used in D.19.2.29 with that of D.19.2.11.1, we notice 
the same formal and archaic style. We may therefore conclude that the con-
tractual term cited in D.19.2.11.1 referred to a written lex.
The next question to investigate is whether it is possible to pinpoint 
the type of industry to which Ulpian likely referred in this text. Elsewhere 
I have argued that the lex contractus in the case of letting and hiring did 
not always consist of a single document.7 In certain industries, especially 
where a contractual middleman was present, the lex consisted of a set of 
general rules of law which were conventional in that industry and which 
were publicly displayed. These were seen as rules which governed all con-
tracts relating to that industry and any individual agreements between the 
contractual middleman and individual tenants was regarded as incorporat-
ing these general rules ex lege. If this interpretation is correct, then, based 
on the language used in D.19.2.11.1, it must be assumed that the larger 
context in which this statement was made must have been a type of industry 
in which it was conventional to use this type of arrangement. Of the vari-
ous industries mentioned in the context of letting and hiring in the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis, there are two likely candidates, namely letting and hiring of a 
horreum or of an insula.8 Given the palingenetic context established above, 
6 See generally Meyer, E. Legitimacy and Law in the Roman World: Tabulae in Roman 
Belief and Practice (Cambridge 2004).
7 Du Plessis, 2006 (3 – 1) Roman legal tradition, 79 – 94.
8 On the letting of a horreum, see Du Plessis, P. “Between Theory and Practice: New 
Perspectives on the Roman Law of Letting and Hiring”, 2006 CLJ (65), 423 – 437. 
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the most likely candidate is that of an insula rented by a contractual mid-
dleman, a venture capitalist, who sublet spaces and apartments within it for 
profit. The middleman could manage the insula in one of two ways, namely 
either using the staff which came with the insula (usually slaves belong-
ing to the owner) or using his own staff in the form of a building manager, 
insularius, and staff. 
Assuming that this is correct, it must be asked why such a rule was re-
quired. On one level, this is not difficult to fathom, given the ever-present 
potential hazard of conflagration. Of course we cannot tell in which set 
of contracts this provision occurred, whether in those between owner and 
primary tenant or between primary and secondary tenants and since no ex-
ample of such contracts have been preserved, we will probably never know. 
Therefore, both possibilities will be examined. The legal ramifications of a 
fire in an insula, could potentially have serious consequences for the con-
tractual middleman who rented the entire tenement from the owner. Let 
us first assume that the term ignem ne habeto formed part of the contract 
between the owner of the insula and the venture capitalist who rented it as a 
business. By inserting such a clause in the contract, the owner of the insula 
wished to protect his asset by sending an unambiguous message. In a sense, 
this is a specific manifestation of frui, that is the permitted use and enjoy-
ment which the tenant acquired by virtue of the payment of rent.9 Any con-
travention of this term whether by the middleman or his legal dependants 
would constitute breach of contract and would enable the landlord to sue 
ex locato for his id quod interest.10 It goes without saying that the inclusion 
of a contractual provision of this kind would have narrowed the contractual 
middleman’s ability to generate profit from the insula, but in certain cir-
cumstances this must have been a risk worth taking. Let us assume that the 
term ignem ne habeto formed part of the contract between the contractual 
middleman and his tenants. There are two possible scenarios under which 
this could have occurred. First, if it had been a term of the contract between 
the owner of the tenement and the contractual middleman, it would have 
to be passed on to the secondary tenants as well, since the prohibition on 
having a fire constituted a concretisation of the general entitlement to frui 
which the contractual middleman had received by virtue of the payment of 
rent. In second place, the contractual middleman may have decided to re-
strict the frui of his tenants in such a manner without the prohibition against 
the keeping of any fire having been imposed upon him by the owner of the 
On the letting of an insula see Du Plessis, P. “Janus in The Roman Law of Urban 
Lease”, 2006 Historia (55 – 1), 48 – 63.
9 Frier, Landlords and Tenants, 75, 146 – 148.
10 D.19.2.15 pr – 1 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.)
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tenement. The motivations for doing so will be explored presently. For the 
moment, it deserves mention that a fire in the insula could of course also 
have delictual implications. Take the following text:
Coll.12.7.1 – 5 (Ulpian. 18 ad Ed.) Item si insulam meam adusseris 
vel incenderis, Aquiliae actionem habebo, idemque est et si 
arbustum meum vel villam meam. (2) Quod si dolo quis insulam 
exusserit, etiam capitis poena plectitur quasi incendiarius. (3) Item 
si quis insulam voluerit exurere et ignis etiam ad vicini insulam 
pervenerit, Aquilia tenebitur lege vicino etiam non minus inquilinis 
ob res eorum exustas, et ita Labeo libro xv Responsorum refert. …
Likewise if you burn or set fire to my apartment house, I will have 
the Aquilian action, and the same is true if (you burn) my orchard 
or villa. (2) But if someone deliberately (dolo) burnt my apartment 
house, he is also punished by capital punishment as an arsonist. (3) 
Likewise if someone wishes to burn an apartment house and the 
fire also spreads to a neighbor’s apartment house and burns it up, 
he will be liable to the neighbor under the Aquilian law, and also 
to the tenants for their burned property, and so Labeo writes in the 
fifteenth book of his Responses. … [Frier text and translation]11
Thus, aside from contractual ramifications, a fire in an insula could 
also have potentially wide-ranging delictual implications, since the burning 
down of an insula would clearly be a case of urere/corrumpere under chap-
ter 3 of the Lex Aquilia.12 While these could not be brought concurrently, 
it is clear from the latter part of the above-cited text that delictual liability 
could potentially be quite extensive and could extend to loss caused also to 
neighbouring buildings.
But could there be an administrative angle to the contractual term ig-
nem ne habeto? Let us take the following text:
D.21.1.63 (Ulpian. 1 ad Ed. Cur. Aed.) Sciendum est ad venditiones 
solas hoc edictum pertinere non tantum mancipiorum, verum 
ceterarum quoque rerum. Cur autem de locationbus nihil edicatur, 
mirum videbatur: haec tamen ratio redditur vel quia numquam 
istorum de hac re fuerat iurisdictio vel quia non similiter locationes 
ut venditiones fiunt.
It must be realized that this edict applies to all sales, not only to those 
of slaves but also those of anything else. There used to be surprise 
that no edict was propounded in respect of hire; the explanation 
is either that the aediles never had jurisdiction over this contract 
11  Frier, B. A Casebook on the Roman Law of Delict (Atlanta, Ga. 1989), 74.
12 See MacCormack, G. “Aquilian Culpa” in Daube Noster (Edinburgh 1974), 201 – 
224.
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or that circumstances are different in hirings from those in sales. 
[Watson translation]13
This classic text in which the Edict of the Aediles concerning the dec-
laration of latent defects in the sale of slaves at market are extended to all 
sales, contains an interesting observation by Ulpian in the final sentence. 
According to Ulpian, the Aediles never had jurisdiction over the contract 
of letting and hiring, in other words, there was never the same level of ad-
ministrative oversight regarding this contract. But does this mean that there 
were no administrative interventions in the letting and hiring of insulae 
in Rome? It is well known that building regulations were imposed on the 
quality of materials used and the height of insulae after a serious of disas-
trous fires in Rome.14 But apart from building regulations, there is also a 
faint suggestion in the texts that the Praefectus Vigilum had a certain level 
of administrative jurisdiction over matters related to the contract of letting 
and hiring.  Take the following text:
D.1.15.3.4 (Paul. 1 de Off. Praef. Vig.) … Ut curam adhibeant 
omnes inquilinos admonere, ne negligentia aliqua incendii casus 
oriatur. Praeterea ut aquam unusquisque inquilinus in cenaculo 
habeat, iubetur admonere.
… And he is obliged to admonish all occupiers not to let fires break 
out through some carelessness. Moreover, he is under orders to 
warn everyone to have a supply of water ready in an upstairs room. 
[Watson translation].
Thus, in the city of Rome, the Praefectus Vigilum and his staff were 
tasked with cautioning all tenants or property in the city not to cause fires 
through their lack of care (aliqua negligentia).  This text also demonstrates 
that practical steps were taken – the keeping of water in all apartments 
– to ensure that a blaze could be tackled. How does this text relate to 
D.19.2.11.1? It is tempting to suggest that is primarily aimed at the second 
scenario set out there, namely where tenants were allowed to have fires, 
provided they were kept carefully. In reality, however, it may be that the 
rules set out in D.1.15.3.4 had a wider application and formed part of a gen-
eral attempt to fire-proof all tenements, whether the tenants were allowed 
to keep fires or not.15 On final text deserves mention:
D.1.15.4 (Paul. 1 de Off. Praef. Vig.) Imperatores Severus et 
Antoninus Iunio Rufino praefecto vigilo ita rescripserunt: ‘Insularios 
13 Watson, A. (ed.) The Digest of Justinian (Philadelphia, Pa. 1985).
14 Robinson, O. Ancient Rome: City Planning and Administration (London 1992), 
35 – 36.
15 Robinson, Ancient Rome, 107 – 110.
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et eos, qui neglegenter ignes apud se habuerint, potes fustibus 
vel flagellis caedi iubere: eos autem, qui dolo fecisse incendium 
convincentur, ad Fabium Cilonem praefectum urbi amicum nostrum 
remittes: …
The Emperors Severus and Antoninus issued a rescript to Junius 
Rufinus, prefect of the city guard, in the following terms: “You can 
also order to be beaten with sticks or flogged those flat-dwellers who 
have kept their house-fires carelessly. But those who are convicted 
of wilful and malicious arson, you should remit to our friend Fabius 
Cilo, prefect of the city. …” [Watson translation]
In this text we can see that the jurisdiction of the Praefectus Vigilum 
went further than mere admonishment. According to an Imperial rescript, 
he could order corporal punishment (fustibus vel flagellis) where a careless 
fire had been kept. The final part of the text confirms what has already been 
observed in the text from the Collatio above, namely that those who de-
liberately set fire to an insula were tried as arsonists. Here we can see that 
this would have been handled by the Praefectus Urbi. A final observation 
about this text relates to those who the Praefectus Vigilum could order to be 
punished for keeping a careless fire. Notice that they include the insularius 
and ei, qui neglegenter ignes apud se habuerint. Thus not only the tenants 
themselves who kept careless fires, but also the insularius, the (servile or 
free) building manager could be punished. 
So where does this leave us in relation to ignem ne habeto? In his semi-
nal book on Roman housing, Simon Ellis argued that it is nearly impossi-
ble to identify a designated kitchen space in Roman housing, especially in 
insulae.16 In his view, the reasons for this may relate to the fact that many 
tenants used mobile fires or acquired their food mainly from the many cook 
shops which could be found in the city. D.19.2.11.1 adds a new level to 
this discussion. It may well be that in many cases, tenants were compelled 
to acquire their meals outside their rented accommodation as they were 
prohibited by virtue of their contracts with the landlord from having fires 
at home. The motivation for including such a contractual provision in a 
tenancy agreement was undoubtedly motivated by a desire on the part of 
the owner of the tenement building to protect his economic asset, but there 
was clearly also an interplay between private and public law in relation to 
the prevention of fires. 
 
16 Ellis, S. Roman Housing (London 2000), 159.
